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Museums, collectors, and value manipulation: tax fraud through donation 
of antiquities 
Donna Yates 
 
Private antiquities collectors and the museums that display antiquities enjoy a 
mutually beneficial relationship based on philanthropic donation. Collectors 
who donate objects to museums gain a number of social accolades and 
museums improve and supplement their collections. As the improvement of 
museum collections and, thus, public access to antiquities has been deemed 
by most governments to be a public good, a variety of tax incentives have 
been introduced to inspire donations. These incentives are usually based on 
the assessed value of the object being donated. However, the valuation of 
antiquities is subjective and problematic and the operations of both the 
antiquities market and the museums sector are traditionally opaque. Because 
of this, tax incentivisation of antiquities donations is susceptible to fraud. 
 
In this paper I will discuss the key aspects of the international trade in 
antiquities and the practice of philanthropic donation of object to museums 
that allow for certain types of tax deduction manipulation. I demonstrate this 
with a case of tax deduction manipulation from Australia and a case of tax 
fraud from the United States. 
1. Symbiotic relationship between museums and antiquities collectors 
Since the establishment of the idea of the public museum in the 18th century, 
a reciprocal relationship has existed between these institutions and wealthy 
collectors of antiquitiesi. Museums were founded to serve the public good and 
progressively moved elite-maintained culture from the private to the public 
domain (Bennett, 1995:94; Hooper-Greenhill, 1992: 174). A museum's goal 
then, as it is today, was “to accumulate, preserve, and display art works as a 
value on behalf of society, and in order to educate the public in their 
appreciation” (Zolberg, 1981: 103). As European phenomenon, museums were 
the repositories of the material culture of empire and the advances of science. 
The wonders of the Classical world, which were thought to be the foundation 
of European greatness, the curios of the Colonial world, which documented 
conquests achieved, and scientific collections, which formed a ‘totalizing 
order of things’ (Bennett, 1995: 96). 
 
The cores of the collections of these new “national” museums were the objects 
of empire that fell into government possession (e.g. the Louvre, which also 
contained many pieces that were “nationalised” post revolution, See Hooper-
Greenhill (1992)). Yet from the outset these institutions depended on the 
donation of objects from wealthy individuals. These collectors turned donors 
not only received the positive social benefits of being seen as benefactors of 
art and education, they often obtained various financial gains from their 
philanthropic activates. 
 
For example, in the 1753 Sir Hans Sloane, a British physician, bequeathed his 
massive collection of over 71,000 antiquities and other items to King George II 
“for the nation” (British Museum, n.d.). Via an act of Parliament, this 
collection became The British Museum, which opened with free entry to “all 
studios and curious Persons” 1759. Sloane, of course, was dead at that point, 
but the bequest came with a clause: “the nation” would pay £20,000 to 
  
S;oane’s heirs, no small sum in the money of the day (ibid). The government 
did not exactly buy Sloane's antiquities, but a payment was made. 
 
Moving to the modern day, museums still depend on the donations of 
wealthy benefactors, both in the form of monetary donations and in the form 
of art and artefact collections. Donations of objects are of particular 
importance to museums due to the increasing cost of purchasing art and 
antiquities on the market, and the desire to spend monetary donations on 
other things such as security, display, conservation, etc. The need to attract 
objects is great and museums are known to “court” collectors as potential 
donors. On the small scale, museums may pamper collectors, provide 
specialised tours, and perform other actions that bring collectors into the 
“cultured” world of the museum.ii On a larger scale, for particularly wealthy 
donors with opulent collections, museums may offer trusteeships, and thus 
donors and patrons are become the museum's governors (Zolberg, 1981: 104). 
In a saturated market, where museums are competing for the collections of a 
limited number of donors, these institutions are engaging in a number of 
schemes to attract patrons. The Guggenheim, for example, holds an annual 
“Young Collectors Party”, which is preceded by an exclusive dinner for those 
already donating to the museum, bringing the Guggenheim “one step closer 
to cementing relationships with these rising philanthropists and their friends” 
(Gelles, 2014). At times museums go even further and “attempt to control the 
private collecting of prospective donors by "helping" them select [objects]”, 
with the hope that the collector will eventually donate those objects to the 
museum (Zolberg, 1981: 112). This practice comes close to violating the law in 
many jurisdictions. 
 
It is clear what the museums gain from this relationship: donations of money 
and objects which further their standing among their peers and, ostensibly, 
benefit the public that they serve. Collectors turned donors, in theory, receive 
social rewards for their philanthropy: they gain standing among their peers 
and can claim responsibility for public benefit (e.g. White, 1998: 175). 
However, due to the value of art and artefacts on the international market, 
cultural accolades are not deemed enough reward for this public benefaction. 
Many governments consider the donation of cultural objects to museums to 
be a public good and offer a variety of tax incentives, usually deductions, to 
donors. This is not quite the lump payment to Hans Sloane’s heirs, but it is in 
a similar vein. If we accept that museum collections are a public good, then 
everyone wins. Collectors get social and tax benefits, museums get objects, 
and the public gains a variety of intangibles such as knowledge, education, 
entertainment, and inspiration. Yet, the situation is far more complicated. 
2. Issues with the donation of antiquities to museums 
One of the most pressing problems associated with the relationship between 
museums and collectors is that the global trade in antiquities, is murky at best 
and almost entirely criminal at worst. There is a significant amount of 
evidence that links the trade in antiquities to looting of cultural sites, 
trafficking of cultural goods, and illicit or illegal sales (Bowman 2008; Brodie 
& Renfrew, 2005; Brodie et. al, 2013; Campbell, 2013; Chippendale & Gill, 
2000; Felch & Frammolino, 2011; Hardy, 2014; Mackenzie, 2011; Mackenzie 
and Davis, 2014; Renfrew, 1993; Watson & Todeschini, 2006; Yates, 2014; 
Yates, 2015). Nearly every country that is considered an antiquities ‘source’ 
  
has enacted legislation preventing the buying, selling, or export of most or all 
ancient items, and some of these countries did so over a century ago (for 
regional examples see: Gutchen, 1982; Shapiro, 1995; Yates, 2011). To be clear, 
most of the antiquities that have been acquired by collectors and museums in 
the past and that are on the market now are at least illicitiii in some way, and 
many are held illegally. 
 
When it comes to the acceptance of potential donations of antiquities, 
museums should carefully consider issues of ethics and the legality of the 
objects. A museum that accepts an antiquities donation may be accepting 
property that was looted and thus, on behalf of the public, may have just 
accepted stolen goods. The legal and logistical entanglements caused by the 
acceptance of an illicit antiquities donation may cost the museum a significant 
amount of money and challenges the idea of museums as bastions of public 
good (see Felch & Frammolino, 2011; Watson & Todeschini, 2006). However 
the museum may not want to turn down a questionable donation because of 
desire to compete with other museums for the best collection, or because of a 
sincere belief that a museum is the best place for the object. Also, in the 
cutthroat world of donor attraction, museums may not feel they are able to 
turn down a donation of questionable artefacts for fear of ruining a lucrative 
donation stream or, even worse, the donor may already be a trustee 
(Ostrower, 2002).iv Refusals of donations, then, are done “with proper 
deference to the wealth of the prospective donor” (Zolberg, 1981: 113), if they 
are done at all. We must ask, if antiquities have a strong potential to be stolen, 
illegal, or otherwise illicit, is it right for donors who give these items to 
museums to be rewarded with tax incentives? 
 
Because of historic particulars, both the museums and the art market have 
developed into sectors with minimal transparency or oversight. The private 
acquisition of art and antiquities has primarily been the enterprise of the 
wealthy and powerful. Historically, the re-sale of these items was seen as 
evidence of the financial ruin of wealthy families: thus the famous auction 
houses (e.g. Christies, Sotheby’s, Bonhams) were founded as a way for 
beleaguered collectors to unload the family treasures anonymously, without 
public shame, and for financially sound collectors to acquire those treasures 
anonymously, without appearing to be crassly profiting from another’s 
misfortune (Lacy, 1998; Watson, 1998). The privacy of donors to museums has 
also been traditionally maintained, with ‘private donation’, whatever the 
reason may be, being a perfectly acceptable notation on a museum display 
card or annual statement.v As museum donation is considered a public good, 
donors are given options to hide their identity for their own reasons so that 
good can be achieved. This may also shield them from public criticism. Such a 
situation provides an opportunity for those who wish to hide questionable 
behaviour. 
 
Auction houses and antiquities dealers are under no obligation to reveal the 
identities of their consignees or their buyers. Museums are under no 
obligation to reveal the identities of their donors. The only time that identity 
must be revealed is during the claiming of a tax deduction for the donation. In 
most circumstances, tax documentation for individuals is not public: only the 
government sees who is donating what. Public anonymity is maintained. 
 
  
If we accept anonymity as an aspect of the art and museum sector that will 
not change, a possible response would be mandatory government auditing 
and due-diligence in all museum acquisitions before any incentivised 
donation can take place. In some jurisdictions there are audits of tax 
deduction claims for antiquities donations valued above a certain amount, but 
this, too, is a problem. 
 
The monetary worth of art is an extreme case of assumed and applied value. 
Antiquities have no use value, have no original cost or creator, and are 
usually the only one of their kind in the world: assigning a price tag to an 
artefact is entirely subjective and not reproducible.vi To some extent, the value 
of an artefact depends on what prices similar objects achieve at public 
auction. Yet this is complicated, not the least because each artefact is unique 
and is not easily compared with any other artefact. Even in auction 
catalogues, the ‘price estimates’ offered by houses do not relate to how much 
the piece is valued at, rather they are marketing tools meant to either drive up 
the price for the piece or to attract consignees.  
 
Appraisals of antiquities are formed by the opinions of ‘experts’. Based on the 
condition, authenticity, and history of the object and based on the ‘experts’ 
understanding of art market trends, they assign the artefact a subjective price 
tag. No two experts will come up with the same price tag for the same object. 
It is very difficult to challenge an expert's opinion on price. Unless the object 
is actually put up for sale at a public auction, who is to say that a valuation is 
either high or low? How can an honest valuation be separated from a 
dishonest one? 
2.1 The stage set for scheming 
To recap, potentially illicit antiquities are donated for tax benefits based on 
subjective valuations within an under-regulated system that considers secrecy 
and privacy to be paramount. Furthermore, these donations are hailed by 
nearly everyone as philanthropic and in the public good, further shielding 
actors from close scrutiny. It seems obvious that some people would seek to 
abuse this system, and they have. There have been a number of tax fraud 
cases concerning the donation of antiquities to museums for tax benefits. 
These represent an interesting way that perpetrators of tax fraud mask their 
actions under the aegis of respectability as represented by the museum. 
 
In the next section I well present two antiquities-related tax deduction 
manipulation schemes. The first case, which occurred in Australia in 
1979/1980, was determined to not actually be illegal, but exposed a now-
closed loophole that was against the spirit of the law. The second, which 
occurred in the United States over a number of decades but was only exposed 
in 2008, was determined to be against the law and investigations related to 
that case are ongoing at the time of writing. In both circumstances individuals 
whose sole motivation was tax benefit donated antiquities with dubious and 
possibly illegal origins to museums. Also, antiquities dealers facilitated both 
cases. These intermediaries were able to visualise the whole system and 
profited from it. 
 
Although these two cases represent actions of bad actors knowingly 
committing questionable acts, and although many donations of antiquities to 
  
museums are made without manipulation or bad intentions, these and other 
cases show that the possibility to abuse this system exists. Because of the 
closed nature of the art, antiquities, and museum world, manipulations of this 
kind may exist on a larger scale than we know. 
3. Latin American artefacts and the National Gallery of Victoria, Australia 
In 1978 the Australian Government's Ministry for the Arts established the 
Cultural Gifts Program (sometimes referred to as 'taxation incentives for the 
arts scheme') based on section 78 of the Income Tax Assessment Act (1936). 
The primary purpose of the Cultural Gifts Program is to encourage private 
collectors of cultural property (including antiquities) to donate objects to 
public institutions in return for favourable tax deductions and exemptions. 
This is different from the similarly named 'Cultural Bequests Program' in that 
it is meant to encourage donation while the collector is still alive. The collector 
as donor, then, gets a financial reward for 'helping develop Australia's public 
cultural collections [...and] helping to preserve Australia's cultural heritage 
for the benefit of present and future generations' (Ministry for the Arts, n.d.). 
 
Yet the tax code as written created two loopholes in the Cultural Gifts 
Program. First, the appraisal of cultural objects to be donated was left 
unregulated, meaning that donors and museums could contract their own 
preferred experts to provide valuations of any piece and, thus, determine the 
size of the tax deduction given to the donor. This valuation did not have to 
take into account how much the donor paid for the artifact in question. In 
other words, donors could select a friendly appraiser to inflate the value of 
the object, and inflate their own tax break. A museum could promise a high 
valuation of an object through their preferred appraiser in exchange for the 
donation. Second, there was no guidance in the law about how long a 
potential donor had to hold a cultural object before it could be donated. 
Under favourable conditions, a donor could acquire an object on paper and 
donate it within moments, qualifying for the tax deduction but never actually 
possessing the piece. 
 
In or around 1979 a syndicate of 22 Melbourne-based business people along 
with Costa Rican antiquities dealer Leonardo Patterson discovered these two 
loopholes and set about to exploit them (Davis, 1981; Elias, 1981). 
 
In 1979, Patterson imported a large collection of stone and ceramic objects 
thought to be from a number of Central American countries into Australia 
(Elias, 1981; 1984). The exact nature of their removal from the ground in their 
countries of origin, their export, and their import is unknown, and the objects 
could be considered illicit. No provenance prior to their appearance in 
Australia is recorded either in contemporary press accounts or on the 
National Gallery of Victoria websitevii and the dealer involved is known for 
questionable behaviour. Patterson was later convicted of felonies on two 
occasions related to the trafficking of Central American antiquities into the 
United States (Elias, 1984), and has faced similar charges in other jurisdictions 
(Ventura, 2013). He has also been implicated in a number of high profile 
international antiquities smuggling cases that resulted in return agreements, 
but no criminal charges (BBC, 2006; Peruvian Times, 2008). 
 
  
After the artefacts were imported, the syndicate paid $1.2 million AUD for the 
objects (Elias, 1984). It is presumed they paid this money to Patterson. Almost 
immediately after the purchase of the items, an antiquities appraiser who 
appears to have been selected by Patterson valued the collection of antiquities 
at $3.7 million AUD, an increase of $2.5 million AUD (Davis, 1981; Elias, 
1981). The antiquities were then immediately donated to the National Gallery 
of Victoria, where they remain today, listed as "Presented anonymously, 
1980". All requests made to the National Gallery of Victoria for information 
regarding the objects, their donation, and the tax incentives involved were 
refused. The syndicate claimed the full $3.7 million AUD deduction during 
the 1979/1980 and 1980/1981 tax years (House of Representatives (Australia), 
1982).  
 
In 1981 the existence of this loophole was revealed to the Australian public 
(Davis, 1981; Elias, 1981). Contemporary reports claim that other collectors, 
dealers, and galleries benefited financially from this loophole while it was 
open, including some arrangements where the works in question were 
'donated' to a gallery but then 'leant' back to the donor for the rest of their life 
(Davis, 1981). As a stop-gap measure, Australia's Taxation Commissioner 
announced that the government would apply the lower figure of either how 
much a cultural object was valued at or how much the donor originally paid 
for the object when assessing tax deductions (Davis, 1981). 
 
The loophole was closed via the Income Tax Assessment Amendment Act 
1982 which prevented 'unintended benefits from being secured' for antiquities 
donations and 'formalised procedures for the appointment of valuers' of 
antiquities. Congressional bills (e.g. House of Representatives (Australia), 
1982) make it clear that the modifications to the Tax Act were made in direct 
response to the actions of the syndicate, Patterson, and the National Gallery of 
Victoria. 
 
The modifications required that cultural property valuers be approved by the 
Secretary to the Department of Home Affairs and Environment. Approval is 
based on professional qualifications and standing within the professional 
community (Australia, 1982). Because of the syndicate's actions, the Act was 
also amended to say that if: 
 
1.   Cultural objects were acquired by the donor within 12 months of 
making the gift except in instances of inheritance, OR 
2.   Cultural objects acquired by the donor for the sole purpose of making a 
gift to a public institution, OR 
3.   Cultural object acquired subject to an agreement that they would be 
gifted 
 
that the amount paid for the cultural object by the donor or the amount 
assessed by the registered valuer, whichever is less, is the official value of 
cultural property for tax purposes. 
 
The act was not retroactive and it is assumed that the syndicate of ‘donors’ 
was able to keep their claimed tax deductions. The Act has since been 
modified and as of the time of writing, value of the cultural objects for tax 
purposes is defined as the average of two market valuations made by 
  
registered valuers made within 90 days of the donation. However, in the cases 
mentioned above, the lesser amount (valuation or amount originally paid) 
prevails (Australian Government, 2009: 1). 
4. Thai antiquities and California museums 
Tax deductions for charitable donations are allowed in the United States 
under the assumption that the donation would match or exceed the amount 
of money the government would have to appropriate from public funds to 
effect the same public benefit. The specifics of United States law concerning 
the charitable donation of artefacts to museums are complex beyond the scope 
of this discussion. However, a donation of antiquities to a museum in the 
United States must satisfy three general requirements to qualify for a tax 
deduction: the donation must be to a qualifying institution (e.g. a non profit 
museum); the donation must be of qualifying property; and the donation 
must display proper intent and not be made in exchange for goods and 
services (Thompson, 2009). Donors claiming tax benefits may deduct the fair 
market value of qualifying museum donations, yet the assessment of an 
antiquity’s value is inherently subjective. Donors, naturally, seek the highest 
valuation for the objects they wish to donate in the best of situations, and 
manipulate the assessed value in the worst.  
 
The IRS has a series of procedures to verify that donations to museums 
qualify for the tax deduction claimed. These are increasingly more onerous 
based on the stated value of the antiquity (see Thompson, 2009: 244). 
Antiquities of a stated value above a certain amount require an appraisal be 
submitted along with a tax deduction claim. This appraisal must be me made 
by a valuer who meets specific education and experience criteria. The 
appraisal must take place within two months of the donation and must 
include the methods that the expert used to value the piece (Thompson, 2009: 
245). If the claimed value of the artefact is high enough, the IRS art advisory 
panel may review these appraisals. The panel, composed of uncompensated 
art experts, raises the value of the appraised art donations about as often as 
they lower it (ibid). The panel may look at photos of the antiquities, but they 
do not see them physically and are unable to get a complete sense of the 
objects true condition. 
 
Despite these safeguards, the opaque nature of the antiquities and museums 
trade, the subjectivity of expert valuations, and the illicit nature of much of 
the antiquities market can shield tax fraud in the United States. The following 
is an extreme example. 
 
In 1979 or 1980 Robert Olson of Cerritos, California, began to import Thai 
antiquities into the United States (United States District Court, 2008a), 
allegedly with the help of Armand Labbé, then-curator of the Bowers 
Museum (Felch, 2008). Many of these were ceramic vessels from the site of 
Ban Chiang in the Udon Thani province, which is now a UNESCO World 
Heritage site (see Brodie, 2012).  
 
Since 1961, previously-unknown antiquities have been considered property of 
the Thai state, and all Thai antiquities, even those in private hands, cannot be 
exported without a license from the government (Thailand, 1961). 
Furthermore, a 1972 Thai government decree made it illegal to export pottery 
  
from the site of Ban Chiang specifically in an effort to curb the widespread 
looting (Brodie, 2012). According to both the Thai government and his own 
statements to an undercover Federal Agent, the antiquities Olson imported 
lacked licenses and, thus, all of the artefacts left Thailand in violation of Thai 
law. Olsen also told the undercover Federal Agent that his shipping company, 
Bobbyo Imports, would bribe Thai officials and improperly declare antiquities 
on United States customs paperwork: the authentic antiquities were declared 
as reproductions upon entry into the United States (Thompson 256). 
 
Olson supplied objects extensively for Jonathan and Cari Markell, antiquities 
dealers who ran Silk Roads Gallery in Los Angeles. The Markells began 
dealing in Thai antiquities in 1988, originally supplied solely by Olson, but 
later sold items they bought themselves in Thailand (United States District 
Court, 2008a). The Markells’ suppliers reportedly disguised ancient objects as 
modern replicas to fool customs in both Thailand and the United States (ibid). 
 
At some point the Markells developed an elaborate tax fraud scheme that 
involved these Thai antiquities. Taking advantage of the tax deductions for 
charitable ‘in-kind donations’ to museums, Olson and the Markells would 
supply ‘buyers’ with Thai antiquities, inflated appraisals, and connect 
‘buyers’ with a museum that wanted the piece. The buyers would then 
instantly donate the artifact. The appraisals were made by a friendly valuer or 
Markell himself, but were signed with the name of a Bangkok-based ceramics 
curator who met US government expertise requirements; her signatures may 
have been forged (United States District Court, 2008a)viii. 
 
Thus a museum would receive an artefact they wanted free of charge, the 
buyer-turned-donor (who never intended to own the artefact) would receive a 
tax deduction, and Olson and the Markells would make their normal profits 
from the artifact sale. 
 
This scheme was exposed in 2008 after a multi-year investigation into the 
Markells and Olson. From 2003 until 2007 an undercover federal agent 
purchased a number of antiquities from the group. As early as 2004, Markells 
had spoken to the undercover agent about his tax scheme, and starting in 
2006, the undercover agent began to focus on the dealers (United States 
District Court, 2008a). The Thai antiquities that the undercover agent 
purchased from Markells were appraised by the dealers' valuers at well above 
the price paid for them and were then donated to the Los Angeles County 
Museum of Art (LACMA), The Pacific Asia Museum (PAM), the Bowers 
Museumix, and the Mingei International Museum, all located in California. All 
told, the undercover agent paid Olson $12,000 USD for Thai antiquities which 
were then appraised for tax purposes at $43,000 USD (Felch, 2014). As a result 
of this investigation 10,000 Thai artefacts were seized from several United 
States museums (Felch, 2013). See Brodie (2014: 29) for a break down of the 
amount that was spent on each artefact vs. how much it was appraised for. 
 
The museums were active facilitators of the scheme: the undercover agent 
held six telephone calls, exchanged eleven emails and nine letters, and had an 
in-person meeting with museum staff concerning his twenty-one objects 
’donated’ to the Mingei International Museum alone (United States District 
Court, 2008a). Tax returns were prepared claiming the appraised value of the 
  
pieces as a donation, allegedly in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 371 and 26 
U.S.C. Section 7206 (2) which prevent conspiracy to assist in the preparation 
of false tax returns (United States District Court, 2008a). 
 
This scheme was not detected by the IRS because of the relatively low 
appraised value of the objects being donated. Most were purposefully 
appraised for just under $5000 USD (Brodie, 2014: 29), the Internal Revenue 
threshold at the time for closer scrutiny. Specifically, a qualified appraisal was 
required to be submitted with to the donor’s tax return for antiquities 
donations valued at more than $5000 USD, and a photograph was required 
for gifts of property valued at more than $20,000 USD (United States District 
Court, 2008a). By valuing the objects at just under $5000, the buyer-turned-
donor would received about $700 USD in tax savings per item (Wald, 2008), 
less than what they paid the dealers for the piece, and was unlikely to be 
audited. 
 
This scheme also hinged on the participation of museums (Brodie 2014). The 
institutions involved were woefully lax in researching the origins of the 
donations they accepted, and comparable museums would have rejected 
them outright. Indeed, the artefacts that the undercover agent would 
eventually donate to the PAM were first rejected by a different institution, 
possibly due to questions about the legality of the pieces (United States 
District Court, 2008b). PAM staff indicated that they thought Thai objects 
such as those offered for donation were illegal to export from Thailand but 
accepted the artefacts anyway after the undercover agent assured them that 
he did not, personally, dig them up (ibid). The only objects that the PAM 
rejected were those that contained human remains or ivory (ibid). 
 
In another example of negligent museum acquisition practice, Markells 
responded to an inquiry made by the director of the Mingei about the 
provenance of the material to be donated with an email that stated that the 
objects came from the collection of deceased LACMA conservator Benjamin 
Bishop Johnson (United States District Court, 2008a). This was a so-called 
false provenance or false history, meant to mask the true illicit origins of the 
antiquities. This statement was apparently accepted with no further 
investigation on the part of the Mingei; Markells provided no proof of the 
provenance he asserted. Markells told the undercover agent on several 
occasions that the Johnson story was a lie (United States District Court, 
2008a). Furthermore Johnson, himself, was implicated in several high-profile 
antiquities smuggling cases, including the smuggling of gold objects looted 
from the famous Peruvian site of Sipán, making attribution to him suspect 
(see Yates, 2013). 
 
Olson and Jonathan Markell were charged with one count of conspiracy to 
import looted antiquities and three counts of making false customs 
declarations in 2008 (Felch, 2014). Both the Markells were indicted on federal 
tax charges related to the inflation of the value of the Thai antiquities (ibid). 
These charges are pending. 
 
Following the raids, the Mingei offered to return 67 questionable antiquities 
to Thailand (Felch, 2014). In June 2014 it was announced that 542 vessels 
stolen from the site of Ban Chiang in the collection of the Bowers Museum 
  
would be returned to Thailand (Felch, 2014). The return was effected as part 
of a non-prosecution agreement reached with federal authorities. At the time 
of writing, the other museums with Thai antiquities involved in this donation 
scheme have not yet returned the pieces in question. 
5. Concluding thoughts 
The vulnerability of museum donation to manipulation has not fallen 
completely off the regulatory radar thanks, in part, to the exposure of 
museum donation loopholes in the press. That said, it is unclear how many 
similar schemes exist. Other types of art donation loopholes have been 
exploited by individuals seeking tax write offs such as so-called “fractional 
giving”, which was possible in the United States from 1988 until 2006. This 
allowed donors to donate a percentage (say 10%) of an artwork every year for 
a number of years to avoid tax deduction caps, a practice that many museums 
actively encouraged (Karayan, 2011: 460; 467). Many of the artworks that had 
been ‘donated’ during that time never left the collectors’ homes (ibid). Such a 
scheme calls into question the public gain from the pseudo-donation as the 
collector not only gets a tax deduction, but gets to physically keep the artifact 
as well. 
 
Although there is a push to make such donation/tax benefit schemes illegal, 
as was already the case in the United States example and became the case in 
the Australian example, people still engage in them presumably because the 
risk of getting caught is low. A small-scale or one time donation fraud for tax 
purposes is not likely to be detected. This is a transparency issue. We must 
question the utility of allowing publicly funded institutions to engage in 
opaque, unregulated markets. As it stands, we are likely to only catch tax 
violations concerning antiquities donations if they are particularly egregious, 
if they turn up in other investigations (i.e. related to the import of illicit 
antiquities), or if those involved slip up.   
 
One area that may be particularly susceptible to this type of crime is the 
developing world. Countries that have an emerging middle or wealthy class 
and whose national museums feel they must compete with older, more 
established institutions, may offer museum donation tax breaks without fully 
assessing potential manipulation. This, it seems, was the case with the 
Australian example (although it is not a developing country): the desire to 
reward donations to the national museum system of this ‘new’ country was so 
great that lawmakers did not think through the consequences. Few 
lawmakers or tax regulators have specialist knowledge of the art and 
antiquities world, but they too believe in the public benefit aspect of the 
donation of cultural property. Countries in which tax codes have been passed 
that contain loopholes for price manipulation of museum donations should be 
examined for evidence of this type activity and those loopholes should be 
closed. 
 
Finally, we must ask if the donation of antiquities to museums is actually a 
public good that is worthy of tax incentives. The likelihood that an artefact 
being donated has a questionable history is very high and it is hard to assert 
that the movement of illicit or illegal goods into public hands is a positive 
thing. Indeed, it shifts a major social and financial burden onto the museums 
and, thus, the public. Any repatriation request from a country of origin will 
  
take the museum’s time and, more importantly, the museum’s money (which, 
in many cases, is public money). A collector that donates an illicit antiquity to 
a museum receives their tax benefit whether or not the objects is eventually 
repatriated, and the public loses both the past and tax revenue. 
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'ancient' cultures. These are usually items removed from the ground at an 
archaeological site rather than passed down or transferred from the original 
creator. I also use the synonymous term 'artefact'. 
 
iiThis led to a particularly interesting case of forgery and, potentially, fraud. 
Mark A. Landis, of Laurel Mississippi, donated fake paintings to over 40 US 
museums over the course of 3 decades. Landis reportedly did this because he 
felt it helped the museumsand because he liked how he was treated when 
they considered him a potential donor (Gapper 2011). 
 
iiiThe term 'illicit antiquity' is used when the legality or illegality of an artefact 
is undetermined in its currently location, yet it is reasonable to suspect that 
laws were violated sometime during the object's, extraction, exportation, 
importation, or sale. An object may be an illegal antiquity in one jurisdiction 
but an illicit antiquity in another. 
 
ivOne interesting example of a museum that broke free from this pressure is 
the New Mexico History Museum at the Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe. 
This museum had a long relationship with collector John Bourne and an 
agreement was in place for him to donate his antiquities collection. The 
museum displayed portions of the Bourne Collection throughout the 90s. 
However, allegations came to light that portions of the Bourne Collection 
were looted from the archaeological sites of La Mina and Sipán, Peru. The 
Bourne objects were seized by federal authorities but were eventually 
returned because of difficulties in proving their illicit origin (See Atwood 
2003). In 2008 the museum announced that they would not accept the Bourne 
Collection (Constable 2008; Nelson 2011a, 2011b). In 2011, they repatriated a 
gold monkey head to Peru that had been donated by Bourne, stating they 
believed the item was Peru’s ‘cultural patrimony’ (Oswald 2011). 
 
Despite the implication that the Bourne collection was tainted, another 
museum accepted it as a donation. Starting in 2009 Bourne began to donate 
his collection to the Walters Art Museum in Baltimore. He also bequeathed 
that museum $4 million (Kaltenbach 2011). 
 
vIn the Australian example presented in this paper, the items donated are still 
listed as coming from a private donor and the names of the individuals who 
donated the collection were not revealed in the press. 
 
viMajor sectors and stakeholder groups, such as archaeologist and most 
Indigenous groups, consider the commoditization of most, if not all, artefacts 
to be a violation of their understanding of the past being the heritage of all 
mankind. 
 
viiRequests for provenance information and documentation made to the 
National Gallery of Victoria were denied. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                       
viiiThis expert, Roxanna Brown, died in federal custody in Seattle after being 
arrested on charges related to this scheme (Felch 2014). This death was 
controversial and the United States government settled a lawsuit regarding 
the care she received in custody for $880,000 (Felch 2013). 
 
ix The chief curator at the Bowers Museum at the time, Armand Labbé, was an 
early target of the federal investigation into this scheme, however he died in 
2005 before the investigation finished. Labbé's successor would not accept a 
'donation' from the undercover agent (Felch 2014).  
 
